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  1. Handbook of game theory with economic applications
    Autor*in:
    Erschienen: 1992-
    Verlag:  North-Holland, Amsterdam

    This is the third volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Since the publication of multi-Volume 1 a decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace, and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory.... mehr

    Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt / Zentrale
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    This is the third volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Since the publication of multi-Volume 1 a decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace, and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory. The three volumes together cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science and individual chapters on applications to disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, computer science, law, psychology and ethics. The authors are the most eminent practitioners in the field, including three Nobel Prize winners. The topics covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash") equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games; noncooperative games with a continuum of players; stochastic games; industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the Shapley value and its applications to perfectly competitive economies, to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science; law mechanism design; and game experimentation This is the third volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Since the publication of multi-Volume 1 a decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace, and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory. The three volumes together cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science and individual chapters on applications to disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, computer science, law, psychology and ethics. The authors are the most eminent practitioners in the field, including three Nobel Prize winners.The topics covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash") equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games; noncooperative games with a continuum of players; stochastic games; industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the Shapley value and its applications to perfectly competitive economies, to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science; law mechanism design; and game experimentation

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Beteiligt: Aumann, Robert J.; Hart, Sergiu
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 0444894284; 044453766X; 9780444894281; 9780444537669
    Schriftenreihe: [Handbooks in economics ; 11]
    Schlagworte: Game theory; Economics, Mathematical
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (volumes <1->), ill
    Bemerkung(en):

    Includes bibliographical references and index

    Use copy Restrictions unspecified star MiAaHDL

    V.4. Rationality ; Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games ; Games on Networks ; Reputations in Repeated Games ; Coalition Formation ; Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics ; Advances in Auctions ; Combinatorial Auctions ; Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Through the lens of Multiunit auctions ; Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling ; Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology ; Epistemic Game Theory ; Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics ; The Complexity of Computing Equilibria ; Theory of Combinatorial Games ; Game Theory and Distributed Control ; Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility ; Calibration and Expert Testing.

    Vol. 1.Game of chess / Herbert A. Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer

    Vol. 2 .Zero-sum two-person games / T. E. S. Raghavan

    Vol. 3 .Strategic equilibrium / Eric Van Damme

    Games in extenive and strategic forms / Sergiu Hart

    Games with perfect information / Jan Mycielski

    Repeated games with complete information / Sylvain Sorin

    Repeated games of incomplete information: zero-sum / Shmuel Zamir

    Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum / Françoise Forges

    Noncooperative models of bargaining / Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein

    Strategic analysis of auctions / Robert Wilson

    Location / Jean J. Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse

    Strategic models of entry deterrence / Robert Wilson

    Patent licensing / Morton I. Kamien

    Core and balancedness / Yakar Kannai

    Axiomatizations of the core / Bezalel Peleg

    Core in perfectly competitive economics / Robert M. Anderson

    Core in imperfectly competitive economies / Jean J. Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz

    Two-sided matching / Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor

    Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets / William F. Lucas

    Bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus / Michael Maschler

    Game and decision theoretic models in ethics / John C. Harsanyi

    Game theory and statistics / Gideon Schwarz

    Differential games / Avner Friedman

    Differential gameseconomic applications / Simone Clemhout and Henry Y. Wan, Jr.

    Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility / Roger B. Myerson

    Signalling / David M. Kreps and Joel Sobel

    Moral hazard / Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner

    Search / John McMillan and Michael Rothschild

    Game theory and Evolutionary biology / Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard Selten

    Game theory models of peace and war / Barry O'Neill

    Voting procedures / Steven J. Brams

    Social choice / Hervé Moulin

    Power and stability in politics / Philip D. Straffin Jr.

    Game theory and public economics / Mordecai Kurz

    Cost allocation / H. P. Young

    Cooperative models of bargaining / William Thomson

    Games in coalitional form / Robert J. Weber

    Coalition structure / Joseph Greenberg

    Game-theoretic aspects of computing / Nathan Linial

    Utility and subjective probability / Peter C. Fishburn

    Common knowledge / John Geanakoplos

    Foundations of strategic equilibrium / John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg

    Incomplete information / Robert J. Aumann and Aviad Heifetz

    Non-zero-sum two-person games / T. E. S. Raghavan

    Computing equilibria for two-person games / Bernhard Von Stengel

    Non-cooperative games with many players / M. Ali Khan and Yeneng Sun

    Stochastic games / Jean-François Mertens

    Stochastic games: recent results / Nicolas Vielle

    Game theory and industrial organization / Kyle Bagwell and Asher Wolinsky

    Bargaining with incomplete information / Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Raymond J. Deneckere

    Inspection games / Rudolf Avenhaus, Bernhard Von Stengel and Shmeuel Zamir

    Economic history and game theory / Avner Greif

    Shapley Value / Eyal Winter

    Variations on the Shapley value / Dov Monderer and Dov Samet

    Values of non-transferable utility games / Richard P. McLean

    Values of games with infinitely many players / Abraham Neyman

    Values of perfectly competitive economies / Sergiu Hart

    Some other economic applications of the value / Jean-François Mertens

    Strategic aspects of political systems / Jeffrey S. Banks

    Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions / Jean-Pierre Benoît and Lewis A. Kornhauser

    Implementation theory / Thomas R. Palfrey

    Game theory and experimental gaming / Martin Shubik

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